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DIGNITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: A FRENCH 
CASE STUDY 
L. CAMILLE HÉBERT* 
Abstract 
In 2012, France adopted new prohibitions on sexual 
harassment into its Labor and Penal Codes. That enactment, which 
significantly broadened the definition of actionable harassment, 
was based on a model of harassment law that defines sexual 
harassment as a form of discrimination, while the French have 
traditionally conceived of sexual harassment as a form of sexual 
violence. Cases decided under the new prohibitions, as well as 
additional legislation adopted in France in 2016 and 2018, the 
latter prompted by France’s “#MeToo” movement, suggest that the 
French are beginning to perceive sexual harassment as implicating 
issues of both dignity and equality and that the underlying 
foundation for the prohibitions are affecting the ways in which the 
laws are being enforced. This Article explores those judicial and 
legislative developments and discusses the implications of a focus 
on dignity and discrimination as the basis for sexual harassment 
law in France and in other nations, including the United States. 
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I. Introduction 
In recent months, a good deal of attention has been focused on 
issues surrounding sexual harassment. In the United States, 
allegations of sexual harassment against a number of famous and 
powerful men have resulted not only in their dismissals or calls for 
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resignation,1 but also the “#MeToo” social media campaign,2 in 
which millions of women have shared their experiences of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault.3 In 2017, Time Magazine honored 
the “Silence Breakers,” the women who have come forward with 
their experiences of sexual harassment and sexual assault, as 
Time’s 2017 Person of the Year.4 The French version of the 
“#MeToo” campaign, “#BalanceTonPorc,” which roughly translates 
to “out your pig,” has been accompanied by a sharp increase in 
reports of rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment.5 That 
                                                                                                     
 1. While the allegations against Harvey Weinstein and other celebrities 
have dominated the headlines, the majority of men—and almost all of the 
allegations have been against men—who have faced discharge or calls for 
resignation in the wake of the “#MeToo” movement have been corporate 
executives and other business leaders. See Jeff Green, #MeToo Snares More than 
400 High-Profile People, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 27, 2018, 6:46 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-25/-metoo-snares-more-than-
400-high-profile-people-as-firings-rise (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 2. The MeToo campaign began in 2007 by Tarana Burke, an 
African-American woman, as a way to reach survivors of sexual assault in 
under-privileged communities. See Alanna Vagianos, The “Me Too” Campaign 
was Created by a Black Woman 10 Years Ago, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2017, 
1:44PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-me-too-campaign-was-
created-by-a-black-woman-10-years-ago_us_59e61a7fe4b02a215b336fee (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 3. The current iteration of the “#MeToo” campaign began as a response to 
the accusations of sexual harassment against Hollywood producer Harvey 
Weinstein, when actress Alyssa Milano tweeted: “If you’ve been sexually harassed 
or assaulted write ‘me too’ at a reply to this tweet.” See Margaret Renkl, “The Raw 
Power of #MeToo,” Opinion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017) (discussing Ms. Milano’s 
Twitter request and the response to that request). Ms. Milano’s Twitter request 
was aimed at providing a sense of the magnitude of the problems of sexual 
harassment and sexual assault. The hashtag #MeToo was reportedly shared over 
500,000 times on Twitter and 12 million times on Facebook in the first 24 hours. 
Id. 
 4. Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman, & Haley Sweetland Edwards, 
Time 2017 Person of the Year: The Silence Breakers, The Voices that Launched a 
Movement, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-
silence-breakers/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) (announcing the 2017 Person of the 
Year as “silence breakers” Rose McGowan, Megyn Kelly, Terry Crews, Taylor 
Swift, Juana Melara, Ashley Judd, Alyssa Milano, Selma Blair, and Tarana 
Burke, among others) (on file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 5. See Kim Willsher, Allegations of Sexual Violence Soar in France After 
Weinstein Scandal, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2017), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/france-sees-sharp-rise-in-
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campaign has also prompted calls for legislation6 and has resulted 
in the adoption of legislation to criminalize street harassment and 
the sexual harassment of women in public places.7  
Even before the most recent attention, sexual harassment has 
been recognized, both nationally and internationally, as a problem 
in the workplace that requires a response.8 A number of nations 
have moved to adopt prohibitions on sexual harassment in a 
number of settings, including in the workplace, with many of these 
prohibitions adopted in the last two decades or so.9 In many of 
those nations, legislative prohibitions of sexual harassment 
                                                                                                     
reports-of-sexual-misconduct (stating that allegations of sexual violence 
increased by 30 percent in France following high-profile allegations) (on file with 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 6. See Dan Bilefsky & Elian Peltier, France Considers Fines for Catcalls as 
Women Speak Out on Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2017, at A4 (discussing 
proposal by French government to impose fines for “aggressive catcalling and 
lecherous behavior toward women in public”); see also Angelique Chrisafis, France 
Plans on-the-Spot Fines for Sexual Harassment in Public, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/france-plans-on-the-
spot-fines-for-sexual-harassment-in-public (discussing French government’s 
proposal to institute fines for “degrading and humiliating comments” and 
offensive “sexual or sexist” behavior toward another in public). 
When the proposed legislation was introduced into the Senate, reference was 
made to improving legislation to fight all forms of harassment “in the 
post-Weinstein context.” SÉNAT [SENATE], SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017–
2018, SÉANCE DU MERCREDI 4 JUILLET 2018 [EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017–
2018, MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 4, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 5, 2018, p. 
9085 (Mme Nicole Belloubet); see id. at 9093 (Mme Marie-Pierre de la Gontrie) 
(noting that the law against sexual and gender-based violence “was expected in 
light of the Weinstein affair and the #BalanceTonPorc and #MeToo movements”). 
In the original French: “Il était attendu, à la suite de l’affaire Weinstein et des 
mouvements #BalanceTonPorc et #MeToo.” 
 7. See Loi 2018-703 du 3 août 2018 renforçant la lutte contre les violences 
sexuelles et sexistes [Law 2018-703 of Aug. 3, 2018 reinforcing the fight against 
sexual and gender-based violence] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2018, No. 1079. 
 8. See DEIRDRE MCCANN, INT’L LABOUR OFF., Sexual Harassment at Work: 
National and International Responses, Conditions of Work and Employment 
Programme, vii (2005) (discussing the approach of the International Labor 
Organization and other international and national bodies to deal with issues of 
workplace sexual harassment).  
 9. See id. at 17–18 n. 57–58 (listing the forty-nine nations with prohibitions 
on workplace sexual harassment as of 2005, with thirty-five of those nations 
adopting legislation for the first time since 1995).  
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resemble each other in important ways in part because regional 
bodies, such as the European Union, place constraints on the law 
of member nations,10 and in part because nations tend to model 
their legislation on examples provided by nations with earlier 
prohibitions.11 
In spite of similarities between legislative prohibitions of 
sexual harassment in different countries, the underlying 
foundations of those laws often differ, as well as the interests 
sought to be protected by those prohibitions. For example, many of 
the prohibitions on sexual harassment, such as those of the United 
States, are based on notions of the need for equality between the 
sexes and generally conceptualize sexual harassment as a form of 
sex discrimination.12 In other jurisdictions, however, the interests 
                                                                                                     
 10. The Council Directives of the European Union, including those related to 
issues of harassment, are required to be transposed into national law. For 
example, Council Directive 2002/73/EC defining sexual harassment and 
harassment based on sex to be a form of discrimination was to be transposed into 
national law by October 5, 2005 and the Recast Directive, Council Directive 
2006/54/CB, containing a similar definition of harassment on the basis of sex and 
sexual harassment, was required to be transposed into national law by August 
15, 2008. Council Directive 2002/73, art. 8d, 2002 O.J. (L 269) 15, 19 (EC); Council 
Directive 2006/54, art. 33, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23, 33 (EC); see ANN 
NUMHAUSER-HENNING, SYLVAINE LAULOM, HARASSMENT RELATED TO SEX AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW IN 33 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 3–4 (2012) (discussing 
requirement for transposition of EU directives on sexual harassment into 
national law). 
 11. For example, the definition of sexual harassment in the European 
Union’s Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 is “where any form 
of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with 
the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment.” Council Directive 2002/73, art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L 269) 15, 17 (EC). 
While containing important differences, this definition resembles in some 
particulars the definition of sexual harassment contained in the United States’ 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Guidelines on Discrimination 
Because of Sex: “Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment 
when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with 
an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment.” EEOC GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX: 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT RULE, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2018). 
 12. In the United States, sexual harassment is generally unlawful only if it 
can be characterized as a form of sex discrimination, made unlawful by § 703 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. There is no general 
prohibition of sexual harassment in the United States, at least on the federal 
8 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2018) 
sought to be protected by legislative prohibitions are those that 
protect the dignity of employees and prevent sexual violence, 
particularly against women. An example of a jurisdiction that has 
traditionally taken this approach is France.13  
In recent years, however, France’s prohibition against sexual 
harassment has been reshaped in a manner to more closely 
resemble that of nations and entities, including the European 
Union, which view sexual harassment as a form of 
discrimination.14 One question raised by this trend is whether, as 
the prohibition of sexual harassment in France starts to more 
closely resemble a framework expressly based on discrimination, 
the underlying foundation of the prohibition of sexual harassment 
will also shift from a focus on dignity to a focus on discrimination.15 
Developments in France in the years since the enactment of the 
2012 prohibition on sexual harassment, explored in the rest of this 
article, suggest that notions of both dignity and equality are 
playing a role in the enforcement and interpretation of the current 
French prohibition of sexual harassment. This shift in focus may 
have important implications for not only the way in which the 
harm of sexual harassment is perceived, but also the way in which 
the prohibitions on sexual harassment are being enforced.  
                                                                                                     
level. 
 13. In France, the prohibition of sexual harassment is found in the section of 
the Penal Code dealing with sexual aggression and violence, including rape. See 
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 222–33. This section is found in the 
Legislative Part of the Code, Book II: Crimes and offenses against persons, Title 
II: Attacks on the human person, Chapter II, Attacks on the physical or 
psychological integrity of the person, Section 3: Sexual assault, Paragraph 4: 
Sexual exhibition and sexual harassment. In the original French: “Partie 
législative, Livre II: Des crimes et délits contre les personnes, Titre II: Des 
atteintes à la personne humaine, Chapitre II: Des atteintes à l’intégrité physique 
ou psychique de la personne, Section 3: Des agressions sexuelles, Paragraphe 4: 
De l’exhibition sexuelle et du harcèlement sexuel.” 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 25–26 for a fuller discussion. 
 15. This is a question raised in articles that I authored or co-authored shortly 
after adoption of a new sexual harassment law in France in August 2012. L. 
Camille Hébert, Divorcing Sexual Harassment from Sex: Lessons from the French, 
21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 22–23 (Fall 2013); Loïc Lerouge & L. Camille 
Hébert, The Law of Workplace Harassment of the United States, France, and the 
European Union: Comparative Analysis After the Adoption of France’s New Sexual 
Harassment Law, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 93, 121–22 (2013). Enough time has 
now passed to provide some information about the answer to that question.  
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II. The Current State of French Sexual Harassment Law 
In August 2012, France enacted two new statutes addressing 
sexual harassment,16 one in the Penal Code17 and one in the Labor 
Code.18 This legislative action was prompted by the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in May 2012 to invalidate for vagueness the prior 
prohibition on sexual harassment contained in the Penal Code.19 
The new statutes resulted in a substantial expansion of the prior 
definition of sexual harassment under French law, which had been 
focused on coerced sexual conduct.20 The new definition includes 
                                                                                                     
 16. Loi 2012-954 du 6 août 2012 relative au harcèlement sexuel [Law 
2012-954 of August 6, 2012 concerning sexual harassment], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.][OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 7, 2012, p. 
12021.  
 17. See CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 222-33. 
 18. See CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L 1153-1. 
 19. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 
2012-240, priority issue of constitutionality, May 4, 2012. The criminal division 
of the Court of Cassation declined to refer a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Penal Code prohibition on sexual harassment enacted in August 2012 to the 
Constitutional Court, indicating that there was not a serious question as to 
whether paragraph I of art. 222-33 was invalid, because the prohibition of 
repetition of sexually related words or conduct was “worded in sufficiently clear 
and precise” terms. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
crim., May 25, 2016, Bull. crim., No. 16-8237. In the original French:  
Et attend que la question posée ne présente pas un caractère sérieux, 
dès lors que le I de l’article 222-33 du code pénal, qui exige la répétition 
des propos ou comportements à la connotation sexuelle, est rédigé en 
des termes suffisamment clairs et précis pour que l’interprétation de 
ce texte, qui entre dans l’office du juge pénal, puisse se faire sans risque 
d’arbitraire. 
 20. Although the Penal Code’s prohibition had gone through a number of 
iterations over the years, at the time of the Constitutional Court’s decision in 
2012, the statute had read simply: “The act of harassing another person with the 
goal of obtaining favors of a sexual nature shall be punished by a term of one 
year’s imprisonment and a fine of 15,000 euros.” CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL 
CODE] art. 222-33. In the original French: “Le fait de harceler autrui dans but 
d’obtenir des faveurs de nature sexuelle est puni d’un an d’emprisonnement et de 
15 000 € d’amende.” The corresponding provision of the Labor Code at that time 
read: “Acts of harassment of any person for the purpose of obtaining favors of a 
sexual nature for his or her benefit or for the benefit of a third party are 
prohibited.” CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L 1153-1. In the 
original French: “Les agissements de harcèlement de tout personne dans le but 
d’obtenir des faveurs de nature sexuelle á son profit ou au profit d’un tiers sont 
interdits.” 
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not only coerced sexual conduct, but also includes within the 
prohibition of the law sexual conduct harmful to the dignity of 
those harassed or that places them in a hostile or degrading 
situation. The 2012 and current version of the prohibition of sexual 
harassment in the Labor Code provides as follows: 
 
No employee shall be required to submit to acts 
1. of sexual harassment, consisting of repeated words or 
behavior with a sexual connotation, which undermine his or her 
dignity by reason of their degrading or humiliating nature or 
create against him or her an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
situation; 
2. incorporated into sexual harassment, consisting of any form 
of serious pressure, even if not repeated, exerted with the real 
or apparent goal of obtaining an act of a sexual nature, if it is 
sought for the benefit of the actor or the benefit of a third 
party.21   
Similarly, the 201222 version of the prohibition of sexual 
harassment in the Penal Code23 defined sexual harassment as 
follows: 
                                                                                                     
 21. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L 1153-1. In the original 
French: 
Aucun salarié ne doit subir des faits: 
1° Soit de harcèlement sexuel, constitué par des propos ou 
comportements à connotation sexuelle répétés qui soit portent atteinte 
à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère dégradant ou humiliant, soit 
créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante.  
2° Soit assimilés au harcèlement sexuel, consistant en toute forme de 
pression grave, même non répétée, exercée dans le but réel ou apparent 
d’obtenir un acte de nature sexuelle, que celui-ci soit recherché au 
profit de l’auteur des faits ou au profit d’un tiers. 
 22. As explained in more detail below, the Penal Code’s prohibition on sexual 
harassment was amended in 2018. The current version of the Penal Code’s 
prohibition on sexual harassment is discussed infra at text accompanying note 
126. 
 23. The 2012 and current Penal Code provisions also contain a third 
paragraph, which provides for a penalty of two years imprisonment and a fine of 
30,000 euros for violations of paragraphs I and II, as well as specified grounds for 
increasing the penalty to three years imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros. 
CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 222-33. 
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I. Sexual harassment is the act of imposing on a person, in a 
repeated manner, words or behavior with a sexual connotation, 
which undermine his or her dignity by reason of their degrading 
or humiliating nature or create against him or her an 
intimidating, hostile or offensive situation. 
II. Incorporated into sexual harassment is the act, even if not 
repeated, of using any form of serious pressure with the real or 
apparent goal of obtaining an act of a sexual nature, if it is 
sought for the benefit of the actor or the benefits of a third 
person.24  
Accordingly, the effect of the enactment of these new statutory 
prohibitions was not only a substantial expansion of the definition 
of what constitutes sexual harassment, but also an explicit 
invocation of the concept of “dignity” as the nature of the harm 
caused by sexually harassing conduct. At the same time, the 
similarity of the new French definition of sexual harassment to the 
definition of sexual harassment in the European Union Directives 
is unmistakable. The European Union Directives define sexual 
harassment as conduct of a sexual nature that has the “the purpose 
or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment”;25 the French definition defines sexual 
harassment to include conduct with a sexual connotation that 
“undermine his or her dignity by reason of their degrading or 
humiliating nature or create against him or her an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive situation.”26 On the other hand, while the EU 
Directives explicitly define sexual harassment as a form of 
discrimination, there is no reference to discrimination in the 
                                                                                                     
 24. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 222-33. In the original French:  
I. Le harcèlement sexuel est le fait d’imposer à une personne, de 
façon répétée, des propos ou comportements à connotation 
sexuelle qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur 
caractère dégradant ou humiliant, soit créent à son encontre 
une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante. 
II. Est assimilé au harcèlement sexuel le fait, même non répété, 
d’user de toute forme de pression grave dans le but réel ou 
apparent d’obtenir un acte de nature sexuelle, que celui-ci soit 
recherché au profit de l’auteur des faits ou au profit d’un tiers. 
 25. Council Directive 2004 O.J. (L 2004/113/EC). 
 26. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 222-33, supra note 17. 
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definitions of sexual harassment found in either the French Labor 
Code or the Penal Code. 
There is a separate provision of the French Labor Code that 
does define some types of harassment as a form of discrimination.27 
That prohibition, found in Article L. 1132-1, prohibits an 
individual from being subjected to “discriminatory measures” 
based on sex or other protected characteristics.28 Those 
discriminatory measures based on sex are defined to include “any 
act with a sexual connotation, suffered by a person and having the 
purpose or the effect of violating his or her dignity or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive 
environment.”29 This provision was adopted for the purpose of 
complying with the EU Directive defining harassment as a form of 
discrimination, but the provision generally does not appear to have 
been used to bring claims of sexual harassment.30  
                                                                                                     
 27. See CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 1132-1. 
 28. Id. Article 1132-1 incorporates the definition of discrimination contained 
in article 1 of Law 2008-496 of May 27, 2008, laying down various provisions for 
adapting to Community law in the field of combating discrimination. Loi 2008-496 
du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit 
communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations (1) [Law 
2008-496 of May 27, 2008 Laying Down Various Provisions for Adapting to 
Community Law in the Field of Combating Discrimination], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 28, 2008, 
p. 8801. 
 29. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 1132-1. In the original 
French: “Tout agissement lié à l’un des motifs mentionnés au premier alinéa et 
tout agissement à connotation sexuelle, subis par une personne et ayant pour 
objet ou pour effet de porter atteinte à sa dignité ou de créer un environnement 
intimidant, hostile, dégradant, humiliant ou offensant.” 
 30. A search of the Legifrance.gouv.fr database on June 27, 2018 revealed 
that there are 10 cases in the Court of Cassation that contain a reference to article 
L 1132-1 of the Labor Code and the words harcèlement sexuel (“sexual 
harassment”); six of those cases were decided after the enactment of the sexual 
harassment provisions in August 2012. A review of those cases, however, reveals 
that article L 1132-1 was generally not being relied on to bring claims of sexual 
harassment. Rather, most of those cases involved claims under article L 1132-1 
for some form of discrimination, as well as claims of either moral or sexual 
harassment under another provision. One of the cases, however, did involve a 
claim of violation of article L 1132-1 by a female truck driver who argued that she 
had been discriminated against by being treated differently from male employees, 
based on her refusal to submit to the sexual demands on her supervisor. Cour de 
Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], soc., Jan. 6, 2011, No. 
09-69438. 
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III. Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment in France 
A. Increasing Use of the Labor Code’s Sexual Harassment 
Provisions 
Although prohibitions of sexual harassment have long existed 
in both the Penal Code and the Labor Code in France, at least until 
2012, the majority of cases dealing with sexual harassment, even 
in the context of the workplace, were decided by criminal courts 
under the Penal Code rather than by labor courts under the Labor 
Code.31 This focus on the criminalization of sexual harassment 
seems to have resulted in restrictive readings of the prohibitions 
on sexual harassment in both codes, because of the Court of 
Cassation’s32 practice of conforming the law under both codes.33 It 
seems likely that the focus on the Penal Code’s prohibitions on 
sexual harassment is also responsible for the chronic 
under enforcement of the law against sexual harassment.34 And 
this under-enforcement, at least with respect to cases brought 
                                                                                                     
 31. A search of the Legifrance.gouv.fr database on July 3, 2018 revealed that 
between May 3, 1990 and July 25, 2012, there were 238 cases in the Court of 
Cassation in which the words harcèlement sexuel (“sexual harassment”) appeared; 
of those 238 cases, 123, or 52 percent, were decided by the criminal division of the 
court. Most of those cases presumably involved the Penal Code’s prohibition on 
sexual harassment, which was originally enacted in 1992. 
 32. The Court of Cassation is the highest court in the French judicial system, 
which reviews decisions from lower courts to determine the compliance of those 
decisions with the law, but which does not review issues of fact. The Court of 
Cassation has the power to annul the decisions of lower courts and send those 
decisions back to be redecided or to reject challenges to those decisions. The 
purpose of the Court of Cassation is to harmonize case law and to ensure that the 
statutory texts are applied in the same way throughout France. The Court of 
Cassation has six divisions, including the Social Division, which deals with labor 
issues, and the Criminal Division. See The Role of the Court of Cassation, 
www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/The%20role%20of%20the%20Court%20of%20c
assation%2025_10_2010%20Version%20definitive.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 33. See L. Camille Hébert, Divorcing Sexual Harassment from Sex: Lessons 
from the French, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 & n. 83 (2013) 
(discussing practice of the Court of Cassation to conform the law of sexual 
harassment under the Penal Code and the Labor Code). 
 34. See id. at 22, n. 84 (discussing the scope of the problem of sexual 
harassment in France and the under-enforcement of the French law against 
sexual harassment). 
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under the Penal Code, has not improved since enactment of the 
new Penal Code provision in 2012.35  
Since 2012, however, a larger percentage of cases of sexual 
harassment have been brought in the labor courts under the Labor 
Code provisions.36 There may be a number of reasons for this. The 
invalidation of the Penal Code prohibition of sexual harassment in 
2012 meant that, if claims arising before 2012 were to be asserted, 
they had to be asserted under provisions other than the 
invalidated Penal Code provision.37 The Labor Code’s prohibition 
of sexual harassment, therefore, was an available alternative for 
asserting such claims.38  
                                                                                                     
 35. See ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], N° 4233, RAPPORT 
D’INFORMATION SUR L’ÉVALUATION DE LA LOI Nº 2012-954 DU 6 AOÛT 2012 
RELATIVE AU HARCÈLEMENT SEXUEL [NO. 4233, INFORMATION REPORT ON THE 
EVALUATION OF LAW NO. 2012-954 ON AUGUST 6, 2012 ON SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT], p. 32–33 (November 16, 2016) (noting the small number of 
criminal convictions for sexual harassment from 1994 to 2010 and noting that the 
number of convictions have not increased after adoption of the 2012 Penal Code 
provision). 
 36. A search of the Legifrance.gouv.fr database on July 3, 2018 revealed that 
between September 4, 2012 and June 20, 2018, there were 175 cases in the Court 
of Cassation referencing harcèlement sexuel (“sexual harassment”); of those 175 
cases, 56 of those cases were decided by the criminal division of the Court, while 
the remaining 119 cases, or 68 percent, of those cases were decided by the civil 
division, mostly by the social chamber. Many of those cases involved the Labor 
Code’s prohibition on sexual harassment, although given that the new statute 
was adopted on August 6, 2012 and was not retroactive, most of those cases were 
decided under prior versions of the prohibition. A number of those cases involved 
challenges by employees who had been disciplined or terminated for sexual 
harassment. 
 37. The criminal division of the Court of Cassation held that acts occurring 
before August 8, 2012, the effective date of the 2012 Penal Code prohibition on 
sexual harassment, could not be considered in a prosecution for sexual 
harassment brought after the effective date of the new statute. See Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Feb. 16, 2016, Bull. 
Crim., No. 16-82377. 
 38. The Labor Code’s prohibition on sexual harassment was not the only 
alternative to bringing a claim for sexual harassment under the Penal Code. The 
criminal division of the Court of Cassation held that an employee’s sexual conduct 
directed at a female employee, including questions about the status of her 
marriage and her intimate life, as well as the presence of picture of naked women 
on the doors of his cabinet, could constitute moral harassment, during a period in 
which the Penal Code’s prohibition on sexual harassment had been invalidated. 
See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], crim., April 25, 
2017, No. 16-81180; see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
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Another reason for the greater number of cases brought under 
the Labor Code may be the broadening of the definition of sexual 
harassment from only coerced sexual conduct, which may have 
seemed more appropriate for criminalization as a form of sexual 
violence related to sexual assault and rape, to include other forms 
of harassment, such as verbal harassment, which may seem less 
appropriate for criminal sanction, including imprisonment. 
B. Broadening Definition of Sexually Harassing Conduct 
Consistent with the broader definition of sexual harassment 
under the 2012 provisions of the Penal Code and the Labor Code, 
the courts do appear to be recognizing a broader range of workplace 
conduct to be unlawful sexual harassment.39 As discussed below, a 
review of cases decided before and after the enactment of the 2012 
prohibitions on sexual harassment suggests that courts may be 
giving a broader construction with respect to both branches of the 
definition of sexual harassment—the previous prohibition on 
coerced sex as well as the new prohibition on conduct creating 
harm to dignity or a hostile or offensive situation. 
In a number of earlier, but still relatively recent, cases, courts 
seemed reluctant to find sexual conduct in the workplace, even 
when unwanted, to be actionable sexual harassment. In one 
memorable case, the criminal division of the Court of Cassation 
upheld the lower court’s rejection of a sexual harassment claim 
against a manager who made repeated proposals of a sexual nature 
to a female subordinate.40 That conduct included multiple 
                                                                                                     
matters] crim., July 11, 2017, No. 16-85214 (unpublished)] (confirming conviction 
of a supervisor for moral harassment and holding that the sexual nature of the 
conduct did not preclude a conviction for moral harassment, in spite of the 
invalidation of the Penal Code provision on sexual harassment). 
 39. This connection between the broadening of the definition of sexual 
harassment in the statutory prohibitions and the broader recognition of sexually 
harassing conduct by the courts does not appear to be inevitable. After all, the 
enactment of the statutory provision on discriminatory harassment into the Labor 
code, discussed supra note 30 and accompanying text, appears to have been 
largely ignored by litigants and the courts.  
 40. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., 
Jan. 19, 2005, No. 04-83443 (unpublished). 
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telephone calls to her private residence and an offer to share with 
her a single room with a single bed after “forgetting” to make a 
hotel reservation for a business trip to Paris.41 The court seems to 
have accepted the employer’s argument that the supervisor was 
only engaged in “seduction,” and that “an attitude of seduction, 
even if clumsy and insistent, by a hierarchical supervisor” was not 
sexual harassment.42 The court noted that the female subordinate 
had not suffered retaliation for her repeated refusals and seemed 
to find it irrelevant that she had suffered what was characterized 
as “unpleasantness,” which included stress and depression.43  
 By contrast, in a case arising before the enactment of the 
2012 sexual harassment provisions, but which was decided 
subsequent to the adoption of those provisions, the social division 
of the Court of Cassation held that acts by a co-worker toward a 
female employee—revealing details of his personal life, writing 
long handwritten letters, sending bouquets of flowers, and asking 
her to meet with him alone in his office, despite her refusals and 
protestations—constituted sexual harassment justifying his 
dismissal.44 In reaching that conclusion, the court seems to have 
relied in part on the difference in their ages and their professional 
status in the company, as well as that fact that the employee 
subjected to the conduct was newly hired, while the co-worker was 
more senior.45 The court seemed to have taken into account the 
vulnerability of the employee subjected to the sexual conduct, as 
well as the fact that the co-worker may have been using his status 
and seniority with the employer to impose sexual conduct upon 
                                                                                                     
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. In the original French: “[L]’attitude de séduction, fût-elle maladroit 
et insistante, d’un supérieur hiérarchique ne suffit pas á caractériser l’infraction.” 
See Cours d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Montpellier, 22 Feb. 2000, RJS 
9 -10 / 2000, No. 1042 (P. Adam, Journal of Labor Law, April 2007) (ruling that 
what it characterized as requests for kisses, external encounters, and insistent 
glances on the part of a co-worker to an employee did not constitute sexual 
harassment, but instead were “a simple indelicate attempt of seduction”). 
 43. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., 
Jan. 19, 2005, No. 04-83443 (unpublished). 
 44. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., 
Jan. 28, 2014, No. 12-20497 (unpublished). 
 45. See id. 
DIGNITY AND DISCRIMINATION 17 
her.46 Rather than finding the co-worker’s conduct to be 
“seduction,” the court instead recognized it as harassment.47  
 Similarly, in a case arising after the enactment of the new 
prohibition on sexual harassment, decided by the criminal division 
of the Court of Cassation, but arising in the employment context, 
the court held that a supervisor’s conduct toward two female 
subordinates constituted sexual harassment.48 The conduct 
included repeatedly asking them to have a drink after work, 
despite their refusals, telling one that she had beautiful eyes and 
offering to “warm her up” when she had been in a cold room, 
challenging the indications of the subordinates that they had 
boyfriends, and sending text messages to them.49 The Court of 
Cassation indicated that the supervisor’s conduct—making 
explicit and implicit proposals of a sexual nature to his professional 
subordinates, even if he underestimated the effect of his acts—
placed those subordinates in an “intimidating, hostile and 
offensive situation” and, therefore, the court of appeals had made 
an “exact application” of the Penal Code prohibition of sexual 
harassment.50  
 Workplace conduct consisting of explicit or implicit sexual 
proposals, as well as conduct consisting of sexual touching,51 
                                                                                                     
 46. See id.  
 47. See id. In another case arising before the 2012 enactment but decided 
after it, the social division of the Court of Cassation held that the court of appeals 
had erred in dismissing an employee’s claim of sexual harassment based on her 
supervisor sending her text messages indicating his desire for, among other 
things, “a sweet day with lots of kisses on her velvet lips”; the employer had 
argued that the messages were romantic and not indicative of sexual harassment, 
and the court of appeals had held that the messages were unlikely to harm her 
dignity. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., Feb. 
12, 2014, No. 12-26652 (unpublished). In the original French: “[U]ne douce 
journée avec plein de baisers sur tes lèvres de velours.” 
 48. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., 
Nov. 18, 2015, Bull. Crim., No. 14-85591. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., 
Mar. 14, 2018, No. 14-19635 (unpublished) (upholding award of damages of 5,000 
euros for sexual harassment based on claim, under prior version of art. L. 1153-1, 
that supervisor touched the claimant in a sexual manner, including on her 
breasts, hips, and buttocks, and asked her questions about intimate aspects of her 
private life); see also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
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however, could fit squarely within the prior statutory prohibition 
against coerced sexual conduct. Accordingly, those cases do not 
necessarily establish that the new, broader definition of sexual 
harassment is being internalized by the courts. Other cases, 
discussed below, however, do suggest that the courts are finding 
workplace conduct to constitute sexual harassment even when that 
conduct is not easily characterized as coerced sexual conduct but 
instead falls within the definition of harassment added by the 2012 
enactment. 
The social division of the Court of Appeals of Orléans found 
the existence of sexual harassment in the context of a working 
environment in which sexual jokes were told and suggestive 
photographs and videos of women were displayed on the workplace 
computers of a newspaper.52 The court noted that “vulgar and 
salacious” language was commonly used, including terms 
particularly offensive to women.53 The court expressly found that 
sexual harassment could exist based on an environment to which 
an employee is exposed, even if she is not targeted by the harassing 
conduct.54 The court rejected the employer’s argument that the 
claimant was intolerant and hard to live with; the court noted that 
“what some people find humorous and not to infringe upon dignity 
can be harmful and humiliating for others, especially with regard 
to sexual jokes directed at female colleagues.”55 The court of 
                                                                                                     
crim., Apr. 26, 2017, No. 16-83934 (unpublished) (upholding conviction and 
suspended sentence of supervisor for sexual harassment of female subordinate 
whose neck he grabbed in order to simulate forced fellatio). 
 52. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional courts of appeal] Orléans, soc., Feb. 7, 2017, 
No. 15/02566 (unpublished); see Conseil de Prud’hommes [labor tribunal] Tours, 
July 1, 2015, R.G.N° F 13/00966 (labor tribunal decision appealed to Court of 
Appeals of Orléans). 
 53. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional courts of appeal] Orléans, soc., Feb. 7, 2017, 
No. 15/02566 (unpublished). 
 54. See id. In the original French: “Le harcèlement sexuel peut consister en 
un harcèlement environnemental ou d’ambiance, où, sans être directement visée, 
la victime subit les provocations et blagues obscènes ou vulgaires qui lui 
deviennent insupportables.” 
 55. Id. In the original French: “Ce que certains individus trouvent 
humoristique et ne portant pas atteinte à la dignité peut être blessant et 
humiliant pour d’autres et notamment en ce qui concerne les plaisanteries à 
connotation sexuelles dirigées à l’encontre des collègues de sexe féminin.” 
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appeals upheld an award of 10,000 euros based on the harassment 
to which the claimant was subjected.56 
 Similarly, in another case, the social division of the Court of 
Cassation rejected the conclusion of the court of appeals that a 
male employee, who had sent a detailed pornographic message to 
a female co-worker about performing and receiving oral sex, after 
she had rebuffed his prior advances, had not committed sexual 
harassment.57 The Court of Cassation apparently accepted the 
employer’s contention that the male employee’s conduct met the 
standard of harming one’s dignity and creating a hostile situation 
in that the “indecent and obscene remarks that he had addressed 
to the employee were likely to affect her modesty and her dignity 
in her professional life.”58 The court noted that the male employee’s 
conduct was insulting and degrading and had a very detrimental 
effect on the female co-worker, to whom it was addressed.59 
In another case, the social division of the Court of Cassation 
rejected the lower court’s conclusion that a female employee had 
not established the existence of sexual harassment.60 The lower 
court had rejected the employee’s complaints against her male 
supervisor.61 The conduct complained of included his harsh 
treatment of female employees, his use of sexist and coarse 
language when speaking with his male colleagues, and his act of 
urinating in front of the female employee.62 The court of appeals 
had concluded that the conduct did not constitute repeated sexual 
remarks or conduct creating a harm to dignity or a hostile or 
offensive situation.63 However, the Court of Cassation concluded 
that the court of appeals had erred in viewing each incident 
                                                                                                     
56. See id. 
 57. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., 
July 13, 2017, 16-12493. 
 58. Id. In the original French: “[D]es propos indécents et obscènes qu’il avait 
adressés à la salariée lesquels étaient de nature à affecter sa pudeur et sa dignité 
dans la vie professionnelle.” 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] soc., 
Sept. 28, 2016, No. 15-16805. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. 
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separately rather than as a whole, as it was required to do.64 
Accordingly, the Court of Cassation indicated that the case would 
have to be reconsidered.65 
 In a recent case, the criminal division of the Court of 
Cassation upheld the fine and six months suspended sentence 
against a supervisor for sexual harassment of a female 
subordinate.66 Among the acts complained of included the 
placement of articles of a sexual nature on her desk, as well as 
sexual remarks, gestures, propositions, and invitations.67 The 
Court of Cassation held that these repeated sexually offensive 
behaviors were intended to coerce sexual conduct and harmed the 
victim’s dignity because of its offensive and degrading nature.68 As 
a result, the court ruled that the conduct constituted sexual 
harassment under both prongs of the Penal Code’s definition.69  
 The criminal division of the Court of Cassation found the 
Penal Code’s prohibition on sexual harassment to have been 
violated in a case in which a supervisor made sexual comments and 
sexual proposals to four female subordinates;70 one of the women 
submitted to his repeated demands because of her vulnerability 
caused by a personal situation, resulting in her claim for sexual 
                                                                                                     
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. At least some of the conduct in the case appears to have occurred 
before the effective date of the 2012 Labor Code’s prohibition of sexual 
harassment, although the female employee’s dismissal occurred after that date. 
However, it appears that both the court of appeals and the Court of Cassation 
were applying the 2012 provisions of the Labor Code. 
  In another case in which all of the conduct occurred before the effective 
date of the new statute, the social division of the Court of Cassation rejected the 
conclusion of the court of appeals that that an employee was not discharged for 
serious misconduct, when he asked four female trainees intimate questions about 
their personal life and commented that it would be good when “we sleep together”; 
without expressly invoking the 2012 version of the Labor Code provision, the 
Court of Cassation rejected the court of appeal’s conclusion that the conduct was 
not a deliberate attack on the dignity of the women. Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters], soc., Dec. 3, 2014, No. 13-22151. 
 66. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., 
Dec. 13, 2017, No. 17-80563. 
 67. See id.  
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], crim., 
March 7, 2018, No. 17-80449. 
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assault and rape.71 The conduct included the supervisor’s crude 
comments about the women’s bodies and dress, his request that 
one of them change her clothing and wear thongs, his pulling at 
the bodice of one of the woman revealing her bra, and his 
comments to the women about spanking.72 The Court apparently 
accepted the claimants’ contention that the conduct harmed their 
dignity because of its degrading and humiliating nature and that 
the sexually suggestive words and conduct, directed at those over 
whom he exercised hierarchical authority, placed his subordinates 
in an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive situation.73 The 
Court rejected the supervisor’s attempts to trivialize his behavior 
or dismiss it as a joke or as a management technique.74  
 Courts deciding cases under the new sexual harassment 
provisions also seem to be recognizing that the harm caused by 
sexually harassing conduct is not only emotional and dignitary 
harm, but also harm to the employment opportunities of those 
subjected to the conduct. In a case decided by the social division of 
the Court of Appeals of Basse-Terre, a female employee made a 
complaint of sexual harassment based on the actions of her 
supervisor in which he pulled her hair in order to forcibly kiss her 
and repeatedly sent text messages indicating his interest in 
meeting her socially and in establishing an intimate relationship 
with her.75 She indicated that she was forced to submit to some of 
this behavior because of her probationary status.76 She ultimately 
made a complaint to her employer, who did not take action on her 
complaint.77 The court of appeals held that she had established the 
existence of sexual harassment and noted that she had been 
harmed not only psychologically, but that she had also suffered 
harm with respect to her professional environment, in part because 
she was isolated at work by close colleagues of her harasser and 
                                                                                                     
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Basse-Terre, soc., Sept. 25, 
2017, 16/00727. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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because work was taken away from her after her complaint.78 The 
court of appeals awarded her damages not only based on lost wages 
and termination of her employment contract, but also 25,000 euros 
for the damages caused by the harassment that she suffered, which 
the court found particularly serious not only because of the 
duration of the harassment, but because of the lack of recognition 
of the professional skills that she contributed to the organization.79 
 These cases suggest that both the courts of appeals and 
the Court of Cassation are altering their views of the type of 
conduct that constitutes actionable sexual harassment in direct 
reliance on the broader definition of sexual harassment contained 
in the current prohibitions of sexual harassment in the Labor and 
Penal Codes. The courts also seem to be recognizing both the 
psychological and professional harms caused by sexual 
harassment in the workplace. 
C. Reliance on Concepts of Dignity and Discrimination 
In addition to recognizing the broader definition of sexual 
harassment contained in the new definition of sexual harassment 
added by the 2012 enactment, there are also indications that the 
French courts are relying on concepts of both dignity and 
discrimination in discussing issues concerning sexual harassment. 
Members of the French political process, including members of the 
government and the legislature, have also relied on concepts of 
both dignity and discrimination in their consideration of 
legislation relevant to sexual harassment and similar types of 
conduct.80 
Some of the cases being decided by the French courts under 
the expanded prohibitions of sexual harassment enacted into the 
Penal and Labor Codes in 2012 involve an express invocation of 
the concept of dignity, by either the litigants, the lower courts, or 
the Court of Cassation. As discussed below, however, some of those 
cases seem to be relying not only on conceptions of dignity, but also 
                                                                                                     
 78. See id. 
79. Id. 
 80. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 90–97. 
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on conceptions of equality, in determining whether the challenged 
conduct constitutes prohibited sexual harassment. 
In a recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Orléans,81 the 
court found that an offensive workplace environment was created 
by conduct consisting of sexual jokes, suggestive photographs and 
videos of women displayed in the workplace, and vulgar language, 
including terms particularly offensive to women.82 In reaching that 
conclusion, the court focused not only on the humiliating nature of 
the conduct, but also noted that the conduct consisted of suggestive 
photographs of women, as well as the fact that vulgar terms and 
jokes were directed at women.83 Accordingly, the court’s conclusion 
that sexual harassment had been established seemed to have been 
based at least in part on the fact that the workplace conduct, even 
if not directed at the claimant, had a more serious effect on her and 
other women.84 This recognition would seem to rely on the 
underlying notion of the European Directives on sexual 
harassment that sexually harassing conduct is discriminatory 
based on its “purpose or effect”—that is, because the conduct either 
targets women or has a more significant effect on them.85  
A decision by the criminal division of the Court of Cassation 
also seemed to rely on notions of discrimination against women in 
upholding the conviction of a supervisor for sexual harassment 
against his female subordinate.86 In two instances, the supervisor 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeals] Orléans, soc., February 
7, 2017, No. 15/02566; see also Conseil de Prud’hommes [labor tribunal], Tours, 
July 1, 2015, No. R.G. N° F 13/00966 (appealing the labor tribunal decision to the 
Court of Appeals of Orléans). 
 82. See Cour d’appel [CA][regional court of appeals of Orléans, soc., Feb. 7, 
2017, 15/02566. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Cf. Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 5 July 2006 on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and 
Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Matters of Employment and Occupation 
(Recast), 2006 O.J. (L 204) 2. The Directive notes that “[h]arassment and sexual 
harassment are contrary to the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women and constitute discrimination on grounds of sex for the purposes of this 
Directive” and define prohibited harassment as conduct that the “purpose or 
effect” of harming dignity or creating a hostile environment. Id. 
 86. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., 
Apr. 26, 2017, Bull. crim., No. 16-83934. The defendant was also convicted of 
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simulated forced fellatio by grabbing the back of her neck and 
immobilizing her.87 There was also evidence that the supervisor 
generally engaged in sexist behavior toward the women with whom 
he worked.88 In concluding that this conduct constituted sexual 
harassment, the court appears to have accepted the contention 
that: 
[T]here was, moreover, no doubt that the acts thus described 
had undermined the dignity of the complainant because of their 
degrading and humiliating character, by reducing her, because 
she was a woman, to that still widespread archetype of the 
object of the sexual desire of men; that these acts had also 
created an intimidating and hostile situation, because she was 
also confronted with the insidious maneuvers of the defendant, 
seeking to gain power over her and to denigrate her in the eyes 
of their colleagues.89  
This language notes the harm to dignity caused by the 
humiliating and degrading act of simulated, coerced oral sex, but 
also that the fact that the harassing conduct seems to have been 
directed at her because she was a woman, reducing her to a sex 
object on the basis of her gender and denigrating her in her 
professional standing. This analysis suggests the discriminatory 
nature of the supervisor’s conduct directed at his female 
subordinates. 
Participants in the French legislative process have also 
invoked issues of equality as well as dignity in their discussions of 
issues of sexual harassment. The report of the National Assembly’s 
Commission on Constitutional Laws, Legislation, and the General 
                                                                                                     
sexual assault against another employee for groping her buttocks. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. In the original French:  
[I]l ne faisait par ailleurs aucun doute que les gestes ainsi 
décrits avaient porté atteinte à la dignité de la plaignante en 
raison de leur caractère dégradant et humiliant, en la réduisant 
parce qu’elle était une femme à cet archétype encore trop 
répandu d’objet du désir sexuel des hommes; que ces actes 
avaient également créé à son détriment une situation 
intimidante et hostile, puisqu’elle était en outre confrontée aux 
manœuvres insidieuses du prévenu visant à prendre un 
ascendant sur elle et à la dénigrer aux yeux de leurs collègues. 
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Administration on the Project of Law Reinforcing the Fight 
Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence90 indicated that sexual 
and gender-based violence, including sexual harassment, violates 
fundamental rights, including both dignity and equality, with 
sexual harassment in particular harming the social and 
professional integration of its victims.91 In the discussions leading 
to that report, the Secretary of State in charge of equality between 
women and men, in introducing the bill to the Commission on 
Laws, noted that “real equality between women and men will not 
be possible as long as gender-based and sexual violence continues 
to be so widespread.”92 Other participants in that discussion also 
                                                                                                     
 90. A fuller discussion of this legislative process is discussed infra at text 
accompanying notes 110–41. 
 91. See ASSEMBLÉE Nationale [National Assembly], N° 938, Rapport fait an 
nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de 
l’administration générale de la République, sur le projet de loi renforçant la lutte 
contre les violences sexuelles et sexistes [No. 938, Information Report in the 
Name of the Commission of Constitutional Laws, Legislation, and General 
Administration of the Republic, on the Project of Law Reinforcing the Fight 
Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence] 13–14 (May 10, 2018) (“Sexual and 
gender-based violence constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of victims, 
including respect for physical integrity, dignity or equality, and affects, more 
generally, society as a whole by destabilizing the foundations of the family and 
the rules of common life.”); id. (“This is true of sexual harassment, the potential 
consequences of which are not only psychological. It also has an impact on the 
present and future social and professional integration of victims, by keeping them 
away from sectors of activity in which they are harassed or fear that they will be 
harassed.”). In the original French:  
Les violences sexuelles et sexistes constituent une violation des 
droits fondamentaux des victimes, parmi lesquels le respect 
de l’intégrité physique, la dignité ou l’égalité, et affectant, plus 
généralement, la société dans son ensemble en déstabilisant les 
fondements de la famille et les règles de vie commune. 
 Il en va ainsi du harcèlement sexuel, dont les conséquences 
potentielles ne sont pas seulement psychologiques. Il a 
également un impact sur l’insertion socio-professionnelle 
présente et future des victimes, en les maintenant éloignées de 
secteurs d’activité dans lesquels elles sont subi des faits de 
harcèlement ou craignent de les subir. 
 92. Id. at 25 (Mme Marlène Schiappa). In the original French: “[L]’égalité 
réele entre les femmes et les hommes ne sera possible tant que continueront de 
s’exercer aussi massivement des violences sexists et sexeulles.” 
26 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2018) 
indicated that sexual and gender-based violence implicated issues 
of equality between men and women.93 
Discussion of the bill in the legislative sessions also invoked 
notions of equality as well as dignity. In the National Assembly, 
one of the proponents of the bill indicated that the fight against all 
forms of sexual and gender-based violence was a “noble cause, that 
of equality and dignity.”94 A speaker in the National Assembly who 
suggested that the bill as proposed did not go far enough also 
equated the fight against sexual and gender-based violence with 
the “global fight against inequality between men and women.”95 In 
the Senate, one of the speakers in support of the bill indicated that 
“violence against women affects the fundamental rights of equality 
and dignity.”96 In the final discussion of the bill in the National 
Assembly, notions of both equality and dignity were invoked in 
                                                                                                     
 93. See id. at 36 (statement of M. Erwan Balanant) (“[G]ender-based and 
sexual violence contributes to reinforcing inequalities between women and 
men.”). In the original French: “[L]es violences sexistes et sexuelles contribuent à 
renforcer les inégalités entre les femmes et les hommes.” 
 94. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 
2017-2018, SEANCE DU LUNDI 14 MAI 2018 [ORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, 
MEETING OF MONDAY, MAY 14, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 15, 2018, p. 3700-01 (Mme 
Alexandra Louis). In the original French: “[C]ette noble cause, celle de l’égalité et 
de la dignité.” 
 95. Id. at 3721 (Mme Elsa Faucillon). In the original French: “Je veux dire 
ici toute notre détermination à continuer le combat global contre les inégalités 
entre les hommes et les femmes, contre les violences sexistes et sexuelles.” Other 
speakers in the National Assembly made similar comments. See ASSEMBLEE 
NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCES 
DU MERCREDI 16 MAI 2018 [ORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF 
WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2018)] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 17, 2018, p. 3892 (Mme Clémentin 
Austain) (“To ensure equality between men and women, to combat gender-based 
and sexual violence, we must be able to move from formal equality, proclaimed by 
law, to real equality.”). In the original French: “Pour assurer l’égalité entre les 
hommes et les femmes, pour lutter contre les violences sexistes et sexuelles, nous 
devons nous montrer capables de passer de l’égalité formelle, proclamée par la loi, 
à l’égalité réelle.” 
 96. SENAT [SENATE], SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCE DU 
MERCREDI 4 JUILLET 2018 [EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 4, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 5, 2018, p. 9112 (M. Guillaume Chevrollier). 
In the original French: “Les violences faites aux femmes touchent aux droits 
fondamentaux que sont l’égalité et la dignité.” 
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support of the bill and its prohibitions of sexual and gender-based 
violence, including its provisions expanding the definition of sexual 
harassment.97 
IV. Legislative Developments with Implications for French 
Sexual Harassment Law 
Additional legislative developments since the 2012 enactment 
of the prohibitions on sexual harassment in the French Labor and 
Penal Codes seem to have implications for the way in which sexual 
harassment is thought about in France, including whether the 
underlying foundation of the prohibitions of sexual harassment are 
considered to be not only issues of dignity, but also issues of 
discrimination. 
A. Implications for Sexual Harassment Law of the New 
Prohibition Against “Sexist Behavior” 
In August 2015, France adopted a new statutory prohibition 
against sexist behavior into its Labor Code, which provides that: 
“No one will be required to submit to sexist behavior, defined as all 
behavior linked to the sex of a person, having the object or the 
effect of harming his or her dignity or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment.”98 The 
                                                                                                     
 97. See ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], PREMIÈRE SESSION 
EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SÉANCES DU MERCREDI 1 AOÛT 2018 [FIRST 
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 
2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Aug. 2, 2018, p. 8480 (Mme. Marlène Schiappa) (thanking the deputies 
of the Assembly for their “important votes in favor of equality between women 
and men”). In the original French: “[P]our leur vote important en faveur de 
l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.” See also id. at 8477 (M. Erwan 
Balanant) (calling for a lowering of tolerance for all forms of sexism and noting 
that “it’s a question of dignity”). In the original French: “[J]e viens vous demander 
qu’on abaisse enfin le seuil de tolérance au sexisme sous toutes ses formes. C’est 
une question de dignité.” 
 98. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 1142-2-1; see Loi 
2015-994 du 17 août 2015 relative au dialogue social et à l’emploi [Law 2015-994 
of August 17, 2015 relating to social dialogue and employment], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 
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stated purpose of this provision was to provide a definition of 
discriminatory harassment, at least with respect to sex, which was 
incorporated into French law to comply with the European Union 
Directive with respect to sexual harassment.99 The adoption of this 
provision had been one of the recommendations of the Report of 
the Superior Council of Professional Equality between Women and 
Men, titled “Sexism in the World of Work,” which was issued in 
March 2015.100 That report stated that sexism was contrary to 
notions of equality and indicated that the term “behavior” should 
be used rather than the term “harassment” because the French 
word harcèlement requires repeated conduct, which might not 
capture all sexist behavior.101 
When this provision was proposed as an amendment, the 
stated purpose of the amendment was to “codify the notion of sexist 
behavior, defined as any act based on the sex of a person, as part 
                                                                                                     
18, 2005, p. 14346. In the original French: “Nul ne doit subir d’agissement sexiste, 
défini comme tout agissement lié au sexe d’une personne, ayant pour objet ou pour 
effet de porter atteinte à sa dignité ou de créer un environnement intimidant, 
hostile, dégradant, humiliant ou offensant.” 
 99. See SENAT [SENATE], PROJET DE LOI DIALOGUE SOCIAL ET EMPLOI [PROJECT 
OF LAW OF SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND EMPLOYMENT], SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 2014-2015, 
COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, SEANCE DU MERCREDI 24 JUIN 2015 [ORDINARY SESSION 
OF 2014-2015, FULL REPORT, MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 2015], p. 6779. One 
of proponents of the amendment described its purpose as follows:  
In reality, it is proposed to codify the “acts by reason of sex” 
contained in article 1 of the law of May 27, 2008, which has 
never been codified, under the term “sexist behavior,” and 
integrate it into the Labor Code in the section devoted to 
professional equality between women and men, for reasons of 
legibility. 
In the original French:  
En réalité, il est proposé de codifier la disposition relative à 
“l’agissement à raison du sexe” contenue dans l’article 1er de la 
loi du 27 mai 2008, qui n’a jamais été codifié, sous la 
dénomination d’ “agissement sexiste,” et donc de l’intégrer au 
code du travail dans la partie dédiée à l’égalité professionnelle 
entre les femmes et les hommes, pour des raisons de lisibilité. 
 100. See LE SEXISME DANS LE MONDE DU TRAVAIL, ENTRE DENI ET REALITE, 
RAPPORT DU CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE L’EGALITE ENTRE LES FEMMES ET LES HOMMES 
[SEXISM IN THE WORLD OF WORK, BETWEEN DENIAL AND REALITY, REPORT OF THE 
SUPERIOR COUNCIL FOR EQUALITY BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN], 2015-01, pp. 82–84 
(Mar. 6, 2015). 
 101. See id. at 82. 
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of the Labor Code devoted to professional equality.”102 The 
proponents of the amendment presented the issue of sexist 
behavior as a form of discrimination, but also noted that some 
sexist acts were already prohibited by the law, including in the 
existing provisions on sexual harassment.103 The government 
opposed the amendment, indicating that while there was a need to 
combat sexism in all of its forms, the government felt that this 
amendment, addressing an issue of discrimination, did not 
sufficiently define the prohibited conduct.104 The amendment was 
adopted over the objection of the government.105 The next year, in 
a law adopted in August 2016, the employer’s obligation of 
prevention, which already applied to sexual harassment, was also 
extended to the prohibition on sexist behavior.106 
The enactment of this prohibition on sexist behavior in the 
context of employment, and the equation of sexist behavior with 
                                                                                                     
 102. SENAT [SENATE],  PROJET DE LOI DIALOGUE SOCIAL ET EMPLOI [PROJECT OF 
LAW OF SOCIAL DIALOG AND EMPLOYMENT], AMENDEMENTS 101, 255, SESSION 
ORDINAIRE DE 2014-2015, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, SEANCE DU MERCREDI 24 
JUIN 2015 [AMENDMENTS 101, 255, ORDINARY SESSION OF 2014-2015, FULL REPORT, 
MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 2015], PP. 6779–80.  
 103. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], N° 2774, RAPPORT 
D’INFORMATION FAIT AU NOM DE LA DELEGATION AUX DROITS DES FEMMES ET A 
L’EGALITE DES CHANCES ENTRE LES HOMMES ET LES FEMMES, SUR LE PROJET DE LOI 
RELATIF AU DIALOGUE SOCIAL ET A L’EMPLOI [NO. 2774, INFORMATION REPORT IN THE 
NAME OF THE DELEGATION FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
MEN AND WOMEN, ON THE PROJECT OF LAW RELATIVE TO SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND 
EMPLOYMENT] 91–104 (May 19, 2015). 
 104. See id. 
 105. SENAT [SENATE],  PROJET DE LOI DIALOGUE SOCIAL ET EMPLOI [PROJECT OF 
LAW OF SOCIAL DIALOG AND EMPLOYMENT], AMENDEMENTS 101, 255, SESSION 
ORDINAIRE DE 2014-2015, COMPTE RENDU INTEGRAL, SEANCE DU MERCREDI 24 
JUIN 2015 [AMENDMENTS 101, 255, ORDINARY SESSION OF 2014-2015, FULL REPORT, 
MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 2015], PP. 6779–80.  
 106. Loi 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016, art. 5, relative au travail, á la 
modernisation du dialogue social et á la sécurisation des parcours professionnels 
[Law 2016-1088 of August 8, 2016, article 5, Relative to Labor, Modernization of 
Social Dialogue and the Securing of Career Paths], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 9, 2016, No. 
0184. The employer’s duty of prevention is codified in CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] 
[LABOR CODE] art. L. 4121-2. The employer’s duty of prevention requires an 
employer to take steps to prevent sexual harassment and sexist behavior, and the 
employer can violate that duty by failing to take those steps or to prevent 
harassment or sexist behavior from occurring. 
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discrimination, has interesting implications for the 
conceptualization of sexual harassment in the context of the 
workplace.  
At one level, the felt need for a prohibition on sexist behavior 
separate from the prohibition on sexual harassment seems to 
suggest that at least some, and perhaps much, sexist behavior 
might not be captured in the prohibition on sexual harassment. 
Otherwise, presumably, there would have been no need for the 
separate prohibition of sexist behavior. 
To the extent that sexist behavior and sexual harassment are 
separate types of conduct, one might inquire as to the 
distinguishing features of those types of conduct. The differences 
between the two types of conduct do not appear to be the effects of 
that conduct, because both types of conduct are defined as those 
that cause harm to dignity and that create a hostile or offensive 
environment or situation for an employee.107 Instead, the 
differences between the two types of conduct appear to be whether 
the conduct is “sexual” in nature, as opposed to “sexist.”108 In 
practice, it might be very difficult to determine in which category 
particular conduct belongs. For example, is the assumption on the 
part of a supervisor that young women hired into a company 
should comply with his sexual demands “sexist” conduct, “sexual” 
conduct, or both?  
The recognition of those involved in the legislative process of 
enacting the prohibition against sexist behavior that some forms 
of sexist behavior likely fall within the prohibition on sexual 
harassment and the recognition that sexist behavior is a form of 
discrimination would seem to suggest that some forms of sexual 
harassment might be viewed as a form of discrimination. That is, 
to the extent that sexist behavior is a continuum, from the most 
serious forms of rape and sexual assault, to what the proponents 
                                                                                                     
 107. Compare CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 4121-2 
(describing sexist acts as those that create a hostile or offensive environment), 
with CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 1153-1 (describing sexual 
harassment as conduct that creates a hostile or offensive situation). 
 108. Compare CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 4121-2 
(discussing acts related to the sex of a person), with CODE DU TRAVAIL [CODE TRAV.] 
[LABOR CODE] art. L. 1153-1 (describing sexual harassment as repeated offensive 
sexual remarks or behaviors). 
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of the prohibition on sexist behavior termed “ordinary sexism,”109 
the differences between what is prohibited by the law on sexual 
harassment and the law on sexist behavior would appear to be a 
difference of degree rather than a difference in kind. That is, just 
as sexist behavior is a type of discrimination, sexual harassment 
might also be viewed as a type of discrimination. 
B. Implications of Adoption of Law Against Sexual and  
Gender-Based Violence  
A new law recently enacted in France further complicates the 
question of whether sexual harassment is beginning to be viewed 
in France as a form of discrimination. In August 2018, the French 
parliament adopted a new law against sexual and gender-based 
violence.110 That law, which extended the statute of limitations for 
sexual offenses against children and enacted a prohibition against 
street harassment,111 also made changes to the Penal Code’s 
                                                                                                     
 109. See ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], N° 2774, RAPPORT 
D’INFORMATION FAIT AU NOM DE LA DÉLÉGATION AUX DROITS DES FEMMES ET À 
L’ÉGALITÉ DES CHANCES ENTRE LES HOMMES ET LES FEMMES, SUR LE PROJET DE LOI 
RELATIF AU DIALOGUE SOCIAL ET À L’EMPLOI [No. 2774, INFORMATION REPORT BY THE 
DELEGATION FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEN AND 
WOMEN, ON THE PROJECT OF LAW RELATIVE TO THE SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND 
EMPLOYMENT] 93–94 (May 19, 2015) (“Certain sexist acts are already referred to 
in our law, acts of sexual aggression, moral harassment, sexual harassment, and 
discrimination of all types. However, the notion of sexism, a fortiori ordinary 
sexism, has not found a place in legal norms. Sexism as such is not a legal category 
and the labor law or the legal provisions applicable in the context of work do not 
say anything about it.”). In the original French:  
Certains actes sexistes sont d’ores et déjà visés dans notre droit, qu’il 
s’agisse de l’agression sexuelle, du harcèlement moral, du harcèlement 
sexuel, et des discriminations en tous genres. Toutefois, la notion de 
sexisme, a fortiori de sexisme ordinaire, n’a pas trouvé sa place dans 
les normes juridiques. Le sexisme en tant que tel n’est pas une 
catégorie juridique et le droit du travail ou les dispositions légales 
s’appliquant au contexte du travail n’en disent rien. 
 110. See Loi 2018-703 du 3 août 2018 renforçant la lutte contre les violences 
sexuelles et sexistes [Law 2018-703 of August 3, 2018 Reinforcing the Fight 
Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2018, No. 
0179.  
 111. See id. at art. 15. The prohibition against street harassment, called 
“sexual contempt,” prohibits “the fact of imposing on a person all words or 
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prohibition on sexual harassment. Added to Article 222–33 of the 
Penal Code was a provision to the effect that sexual harassment 
also occurs when words or behaviors are imposed on the same 
person by several persons, in a concerted manner, at the 
instigation of one person, or successively with the knowledge that 
the words or behaviors are being repeated.112 The impact study by 
the government on the proposed legislation indicated that the 
purpose of this provision was to reach cyber harassment.113 
                                                                                                     
behavior with a sexual or sexist connotation that is harmful to his or her dignity 
because of its degrading or humiliating character or that creates against him or 
her an intimidating, hostile, or offensive situation,” when that action does not 
otherwise violate specified existing provisions of the Penal Code relating to sexual 
violence. Id. In the original French: 
 Constitue un outrage sexiste le fait, hors les cas prévus aux articles 
222-13, 222-32, 222-33 et 222-33-2-2, d’imposer à une personne tout 
propos ou comportement à connotation sexuelle ou sexiste qui soit 
porte atteinte à sa dignité en raison de son caractère dégradant ou 
humiliant, soit crée à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile 
ou offensante. 
This new offense was modeled after the Penal Code’s prohibition on sexual 
harassment. See SÉNAT [SENATE], N° 574, RAPPORT D’INFORMATION FAI AU NOM DE 
LA DELEGATION AUX DROITS DES FEMMES ET À L’EGALITÉ DES CHANCES ENTRE LES 
HOMMES ET LES FEMMES SUR LE PROJECT DE LOI RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE CONTRE LES 
VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [NO. 574, INFORMATION REPORT MADE IN THE 
NAME OF THE DELEGATION OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY BETWEEN 
MEN AND WOMEN, ON THE PROJECT OF LAW REINFORCING THE FIGHT AGAINST 
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] 25 (June 14, 2018) (“The definition of 
sexual contempt was inspired by that of sexual harassment, with the difference 
that it does not require the repetition of facts implied by ambient harassment.”). 
In the original French: “[L]a définition de l’outrage sexiste s’inspire de celle du 
harcèlement sexuel, à la différence près qu’elle n’exige pas la répétition des faits 
que suppose le harcèlement dit d’ambiance.” 
 112. See Loi 2018-703 du 3 août 2018 renforçant la lutte contre les violences 
sexuelles et sexistes [Law 2018-703 of August 3, 2018 Reinforcing the Fight 
Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2018, No. 
0179, at art. 11. In the original French:  
1° Lorsque ces propos ou comportements sont imposés à une même 
victime par plusieurs personnes, de manière concertée ou à 
l’instigation de l’une d’elles, alors même que chacune de ces personnes 
n’a pas agi de façon répétée; 2° Lorsque ces propos ou comportements 
sont imposés à une même victime, successivement, par plusieurs 
personnes qui, même en l’absence de concertation, savent que ces 
propos ou comportements caractérisent une répétition. 
 113. See ETUDE D’IMPACT [IMPACT STUDY], PROJET DE LOI RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE 
CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTE [PROJECT OF LAW REINFORCING THE 
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Another change to Article 222-33 of the Penal Code was to add as 
an additional ground for increases to the penalties for violation of 
the statute when the conduct is committed using a public online 
communication service or an electronic or digital medium.114 
Another change to the Penal Code’s sexual harassment 
provision followed a circuitous route before being ultimately 
adopted. In the version of the bill initially adopted by the National 
Assembly, the words ou sexiste would have been added after the 
word sexuelle to Article 222-33, paragraph I of the Penal Code,115 
so that the prohibition of sexual harassment in the Penal Code 
would prohibit not only words or behavior with a sexual 
connotation, but also words or behavior with a sexist or 
gender-based connotation, when that conduct had the purpose of 
undermining an individual’s dignity or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive situation.116  
                                                                                                     
FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] 39-42 (March 19, 2018). 
 114. See Loi 2018-703 du 3 août 2018 renforçant la lutte contre les violences 
sexuelles et sexistes [Law 2018-703 of August 3, 2018 Reinforcing the Fight 
Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2018, No. 
0179, at art. 11. In the original French: “Par l’utilisation d’un service de 
communication au public en ligne ou par le biais d’un support numérique or 
électronique.” 
 115. This language was added to the version of the bill approved by the 
National Assembly by Amendment 208, which was accepted by the government 
and adopted without discussion. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], 
SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SÉANCES DU MERCREDI 16 MAI 2018 
[ORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2018], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], May 17, 2018. The amendment indicated that its purpose was to align 
the definition of sexual harassment in the Penal Code with the definition of the 
new crime of sexist contempt by adding the sexist character of the words and 
behavior likely to constitute sexual harassment. Id. In the original French: 
“Amendement de cohérence, visant à aligner, hors la répétition, la définition du 
harcèlement sexuel telle qu’elle figure à l’article 222-33 du code pénal et la 
définition de l’outrage sexiste créé par l’article 4, en ajoutant le caractère sexiste 
des propos et comportements susceptibles de constituer le harcèlement sexuel.” 
 116. See ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], PROJET DE LOI 
RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [PROJECT OF 
LAW REINFORCING THE FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] (May 
11, 2018), Text No. 115. 
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That language was in the version of the bill introduced in the 
Senate,117 but was removed by the Senate’s Commission on 
Constitutional Laws, Legislation, Universal Suffrage, Rules and 
General Administration,118 for the stated purpose of avoiding 
confusion between the crime of sexual harassment and the newly 
created offense of sexist contempt; the contention was that the 
addition of the prohibition of sexist behavior in the sexual 
harassment provision resulted in a lack of clarity between the 
definitions of the two offenses.119 Amendments to reinstate that 
language were initially rejected by the Senate.120 The version of the 
bill originally approved by the Senate did not contain that 
language.121 However, the Joint Mixed Commission, charged with 
resolving inconsistencies in bills between the National Assembly 
and the Senate, reinstated the language.122 The text of the Joint 
                                                                                                     
 117. See SENAT [SENATE], N° 487, PROJET DE LOI RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE CONTRE 
LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [NO. 487, PROJECT OF LAW REINFORCING THE 
FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] (May 17, 2018). 
 118. See SENAT [SENATE], N° 590, PROJET DE LOI RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE 
CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [NO. 590, PROJECT OF LAW 
REINFORCING THE FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] 
TEXTE DE LA COMMISSION DES LOIS CONSTITUTIONELLES, DE LEGISLATION, DU 
SUFFRAGE UNIVERSEL, DU REGLEMENT ET D’ADMINISTRATION GENERALE [TEXT OF THE 
COMMISSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS, LEGISLATION, UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, RULES 
AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION] (June 20, 2018). 
 119. See AMENDEMENT COM-66 [AMENDMENT COM-66], PROJET DE LOI LA 
LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTE, [PROJECT OF LAW OF THE FIGHT 
AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] (June 18, 2018); see also 
ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], N° 589, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA 
COMMISSION DES LOIS CONSTITUTIONNELLES, DE LEGISLATION, DU SUFFRAGE 
UNIVERSAL, DU REGLEMENT ET D’ADMINISTRATION GENERALE [NO. 589, REPORT MADE 
IN THE NAME OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS, LEGISLATION, 
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, RULES, AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION] 54–55, 97–98 (June 
20, 2018). 
 120. See SENAT [SENATE], PROJET DE LOI LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES 
SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [PROJECT OF LAW OF THE FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND 
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] AMENDEMENTS 41, 114, 132 [AMENDMENTS 41, 114, 
132], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], July 6, 2018, p. 9212. 
 121. See SENAT [SENATE], N° 134, PROJET DE LOI D’ORIENTATION ET DE 
PROGRAMMATION RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUEL LES ET 
SEXISTES, [NO. 134, PROJECT OF LAW OF ORIENTATION AND PROGRAMMING 
REINFORCING THE FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] (July 5, 
2018). 
 122. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], N° 1186 [No. 1186], SENAT 
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Mixed Commission was then adopted by the Senate123 and the 
National Assembly124 and promulgated into law.125 The text of the 
prohibition on sexual harassment in the Penal Code now reads in 
relevant part: 
I. Sexual harassment is the act of imposing on a person, in a 
repeated manner, words or behavior with a sexual or 
gender-based connotation, which undermine his or her dignity 
by reason of their degrading or humiliating nature or create 
against him or her an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
situation.126 
The legislative history of consideration of this provision 
reveals disagreements not only about the wisdom of including this 
                                                                                                     
[SENATE], N° 686 [No. 686], RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION MIXTE 
PARITAIRE (1) CHARGEE DE PROPOSER UN TEXTE SUR LES DISPOSITIONS RESTANT EN 
DISCUSSION DU PROJET DE LOI D’ORIENTATION ET DE PROGRAMMATION RENFORÇANT LA 
LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [REPORT MADE IN THE NAME 
OF THE JOINT MIXED COMMISSION (1) CHARGED WITH PROPOSING TEXT ON THE 
REMAINING PROVISIONS OF THE PROJECT OF LAW ON ORIENTATION AND 
PROGRAMMING REINFORCING THE FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE] (July 23, 2018); see ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], N° 
1186 [NO. 1186], SENAT [SENATE], N° 687 [No. 687], PROJET DE LOI D’ORIENTATION 
ET DE PROGRAMMING RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET 
SEXISTES [PROJECT OF LAW OF ORIENTATION AND PROGRAMMING REINFORCING THE 
FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE] (July 23, 2018) (adding the 
words ou sexiste in paragraph I of article 222-33 of the Penal Code). 
 123. SENAT [SENATE], N° 156, PROJET DE LOI RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE CONTRE 
LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [No. 156, PROJECT OF LAW REINFORCING THE 
FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE], (July 31, 2018). The project 
of law was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 252 to 0, with 90 abstentions. 
 124. ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], N° 169, PROJET DE LOI 
RENFORÇANT LA LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET SEXISTES [NO. 169, 
PROJECT OF LAW REINFORCING THE FIGHT AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY] (August 1, 2018). The project of law was adopted 
by the National Assembly by a vote of 92 to 0, with 8 members abstaining. 
 125.  See Loi 2018-703 du 3 août 2018 renforçant la lutte contre les violences 
sexuelles et sexistes [Law 2018-703 of August 3, 2018 Reinforcing the Fight 
Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 5, 2018, No. 
0179, at art. 11. 
 126. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] [PENAL CODE] art. 222-33. In the original French: 
“Le harcèlement sexuel est le fait d’imposer à une personne, de façon répétée, des 
propos ou comportements à connotation sexuelle ou sexiste qui soit portent 
atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère dégradant ou humiliant, soit 
créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offensante.” 
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language in the bill, but also of its effects. In addition, there seems 
to have been disagreement generally about the equivalence, or lack 
of equivalence, between the categories of sexual and sexist 
behavior by participants in the legislative process. 
Legislative discussions of the bill indicate that at least some 
legislators were equating sexual conduct and sexism. Erwan 
Balanant, the reporter on behalf of the delegation for women’s 
rights and equal opportunities for men and women, noted: “Sexist 
and sexual violence is a massive phenomenon in our society, 
always marked by sexism. Gender stereotypes continue to assign 
women and men to predefined roles that legitimize now acceptable 
dominance relations.”127 
Other participants in the legislative process, however, seemed 
to draw a distinction between sexual conduct and gender-based or 
sexist conduct. In response to a proposed amendment in the 
National Assembly to delete the word sexistes from the title of the 
bill,128 both the reporter on the bill and the Secretary of State 
responsible for issues of equality between men and women opposed 
the amendment, indicating that some sexist behavior was not 
sexual and therefore sexual behavior and sexist behavior was not 
                                                                                                     
 127. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 
2017-2018, SEANCES DU LUNDI 14 MAI 2018 [ORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, 
MEETING OF MONDAY, MAY 14, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May, 15, 2018, p. 3702 (M. Erwan 
Balanant). In the original French: “Les violences sexistes et sexuelles constituent 
un phénomène massif dans notre société, toujours empreinte de sexisme. Les 
stéréotypes sexués continuent d’assigner les femmes et les hommes à des rôles 
prédéfinis qui viennent légitimer des rapports de domination désormais 
acceptables.”  
 128. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], AMENDEMENT N˚ 187 
[AMENDMENT NO. 187], PROJET DE LOI CONTRE LES VIOLENCES SEXUELLES ET 
SEXISTES [PROJECT OF LAW AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE], 
SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCE DU MERCREDI 16 MAI 2018 [ORDINARY 
SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL 
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 17, 2018, 
p. 3940. The stated purpose of the amendment was to avoid inequality between 
men and women, on the grounds that the fight against sexist violence concerns 
women more than men and therefore engenders ostracization of men. See id. In 
the original French: “Actuellement, la lutte contre les violences sexistes concerne 
davantage les femmes que les hommes. Cette dynamique engendre une certaine 
ostracisation de l’homme et rompt avec la volonté affichée par le gouvernement 
de promouvoir l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes.” 
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the same thing.129 Similar comments were made when 
amendments were proposed, one by the government, in the Senate 
to restore the words ou sexistes to the proposed change to the Penal 
Code provision on sexual harassment, after that language had 
been removed by the Senate’s Commission on Laws. The Secretary 
of the State, in presenting the amendment on behalf of the 
government, seemed to draw a distinction between sexual and 
sexist conduct, by noting that “harassment can be sexist without 
being sexual” as an important reason for adding the term ou 
sexistes back into the bill.130 Later in the Senate discussion, the 
Secretary of State responsible for equality between men and 
women gave her definition of the term le sexisme as “the different 
and negative treatment of women as compared to men.”131 These 
points can be understood to suggest not that there is no overlap 
between sexual and sexist behavior, but that there is not complete 
overlap, in that sexist behavior might consist of both sexual and 
non-sexual behavior. 
Curiously, one of the opponents of the amendment in the 
Senate to restore the term sexistes to the bill also drew a distinction 
between sexual and sexist conduct as justification for that position. 
She indicated that it was necessary not to assimilate sexist and 
sexual behavior, which “bring together different realities,” noting 
                                                                                                     
 129. ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY], SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 
2017-2018, SEANCE DU MERCREDI 16 MAI 2018 [ORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, 
MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIC 
FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 17, 2018, p. 3940 (Mme. 
Alexandra Louis) (quoting the reporter) (“Through this text, we want to attack 
sexual as well as sexist violence.”). In the original French: “À travers le présent 
texte, nous souhaitons nous attaquer aux violences sexuelles aussi bien que 
sexistes.” See also id. (Mme. Marlène Schiappa) (quoting the secretary of state 
responsible for issues of equity between men and women) (“In this case, there is 
gender-based violence that is not sexual; sexism is not the same thing.”). In the 
original French: “En l’occurrence, il existe des violences sexistes qui ne sont pas 
sexuelles le sexisme, ce n’est pas la même chose.”  
 130. SENAT [SENATE], SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCE DU 
JEUDI 5 JUILLET 2018 [EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF 
THURSDAY, JULY 5, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 6, 2018, p. 9211 (Mme. Marlène Schiappa). 
In the original French: “un harcèlement peut être sexiste sans être sexuel.” 
 131. Id. at 9220 (Mme. Marlène Schiappa). In the original French: “Qu’est-ce 
que le sexisme? C’est traiter différemment et négativement une femme par 
rapport à un homme.” 
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that there was a real difference between “the facts of sexual 
harassment and the facts of sexist harassment.”132 She also noted, 
however, the similarity between sexual harassment as currently 
defined in the law and the new offense of sexual contempt, which 
she said “meets the same definition as sexual harassment, but 
without the requirement of repetition, and which concerns sexist 
remarks.”133 
Other participants in the legislative process seem to have 
taken a more nuanced view of the distinction between sexual and 
sexist conduct. A proponent of one of the amendments to restore 
the words ou sexistes to the bill explained that the purpose of the 
amendment was to codify the reasoning of the decision of the Court 
of Appeals of Orléans,134 which had indicated that the prohibition 
on sexual harassment could be violated by an environment in 
which obscene and vulgar comments and jokes were made, which 
she indicated was “not sexual harassment, but the creation of a 
sexist environment.”135 The explanatory text of that amendment 
indicates that the jurisprudence under the existing sexual 
harassment prohibition in the Labor Code already included 
gender-based or sexist harassment and that the amendment was 
                                                                                                     
 132. Id. (Mme. Marie Mercier). In the original French: “En effet, il ne faut pas 
assimiler les propos sexuels et les propos sexistes, qui regroupent des réalités 
différentes et nous faisons une réelle différence entre les faits de harcèlement 
sexuel et les faits de harcèlement sexiste.” 
 133. Id. (Mme. Marie Mercier). In the original French: “Ces derniers doivent 
être réprimés par le delit d’outrage sexiste, qui répond à la même définition que 
le harcèlement sexuel, mais sans l’exigence de répétition, et qui concerne les 
propos à caractère sexiste.” 
 134. See discussion of this case supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.  
 135. SENAT [SENATE], SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCE DU 
JEUDI 5 JUILLET 2018 [EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF 
THURSDAY, JULY 5, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 6, 2018, p. 9210 (Mme. Laurence Rossignol). 
In the original French:  
Cet amendement vise, d’une part, à tirer les conséquences de la 
jurisprudence de la cour d’appel d’Orléans, qui a considéré que le 
harcèlement sexuel peut consister en un harcèlement environnemental 
ou d’ambiance. Sans être directement visée, la victime subit les 
provocations et blagues obscènes et vulgaires qui lui deviennent 
insupportables. Ce n’est pas du harcèlement sexuel, mais du 
harcèlement d’ambiance sexiste. 
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necessary to codify that decision and confirm that sexual 
harassment was a broad concept.136 
Another proponent of restoring the words ou sexistes into the 
provision of the bill on sexual harassment indicated that the 
purpose of this portion of the bill was to “reinforce” the definition 
of harassment and to expressly mention the sexist character of 
harassment.137 To do that, she indicated that it was necessary to 
recognize that harassment of women consists of both sexual and 
sexist behavior.138 In making that distinction, she seemed to 
suggest that the distinction between the two types of behavior was 
that sexual conduct was physical, while sexist behavior consisted 
of “hurtful and humiliating remarks that aim to belittle women 
                                                                                                     
 136. See SENAT [SENATE], PROJET DE LOI LA LUTTE CONTRE LES VIOLENCES 
SEXUELLES ET SEXISTE, AMENDEMENT N˚ 41, REJETE [PROJECT OF LAW ON THE FIGHT 
AGAINST SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, AMENDMENT NO. 41, REJECTED], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], July 6, 2018, p. 9211 (“The case law confirms the existence of a 
gender-based environmental harassment. The modification contained in this 
amendment asserts that harassment is a broad concept, not limited to blackmail 
aimed at obtaining sexual favors, and is in the interests of the victims 
themselves.”). In the original French: “Cette jurisprudence confirme l’existence 
d’un harcèlement environnemental à caractère sexiste. La modification de 
rédaction portée par cet amendement affirme que le harcèlement est une notion 
large, ne devant pas être limitée au chantage visant à l’obtention de faveurs 
sexuelle, et ce dans l’intérêt même des victimes.”  
The proponent of the amendment indicated that the amendment was necessary 
because the National Assembly had already codified the case law, but the Law 
Commission had removed the reference to sexist harassment. SENAT [SENATE], 
SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCE DU JEUDI 5 JUILLET 2018 
[EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF THURSDAY, JULY 5, 2018], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], July 6, 2018, p. 9210 (Mme. Laurence Rossignol). In the original French: 
“L’Assemblée nationale avait déjà codifié cette jurisprudence, mais la commission 
des lois a supprimé la référence au harcèlement sexiste.” 
 137. See SENAT [SENATE], SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCE DU 
JEUDI 5 JUILLET 2018 [EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF 
THURSDAY, JULY 5, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 6, 2018, p. 9211 (Mme. Esther Benbassa). In 
the original French: “L’article 3 du présent projet de loi visait à renforcer la 
définition du harcèlement . . . . Le présent amendement vise donc à rétablir dans 
son état initial le présent article 3, en mentionnant expressément le caractère 
sexiste que peut revêtir le harcèlement.” 
 138. Id. (Mme. Esther Benbassa). 
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because they are women.”139 Her characterization, however, of the 
differences between the types of conduct seemed to draw 
disagreement, because when she indicated that a comment such as 
“you have beautiful buttocks” would be sexist, not sexual, her 
comment drew vocal disagreement from other participants in the 
debate.140 Regardless of the accuracy of her assessment of the 
distinction between sexual and sexist harassment, her comments 
about “reinforcing” the definition of sexual harassment seemed to 
suggest the possibility that degrading and sexist words and 
conduct directed at women because of their gender might already 
be included within the prohibition on sexual harassment and that 
the statutory language should recognize that reality. 
One objection voiced to including the words ou sexistes in the 
Penal Code’s prohibition against sexual harassment was a fear 
that the addition of sexist behaviors to the definition of sexual 
harassment would result in “downgrading” sexual harassment.141 
The concern seemed to be not that sexist behavior was necessarily 
less serious than sexual behavior; instead, the concern was that 
the new offense of sexual contempt would be relied on for cases 
that might formerly have been prosecuted as sexual harassment, 
resulting in a lower penalty for such actions. 
The legislative process concerning the Project of Law 
Reinforcing the Fight Against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
suggests some uncertainty about the understanding of the 
equivalence or divergence between sexual harassing conduct and 
sexist conduct. Some of the discussion during that process might 
be understood as suggesting that the two types of conduct are 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. (Mme. Esther Benbassa). In the original French: “Les violences faites 
aux femmes ne sont pas seulement physiques, elles passent aussi par ces 
comportements machistes banalisés, ces remarques blessantes et humiliantes qui 
visent à rabaisser les femmes, car elles sont femmes.” 
 140. Id. (statement of Mme. Esther Benbassa). In the original French: “Quand 
on vous dit tous les jours devant la photocopieuse: ‘Tu as de belles fesses!’ ce n’est 
pas du harcèlement sexuel, mais du harcèlement sexiste. (Mme le rapporteur et 
M. le président de la commission le contestent).” 
 141. SENAT [SENATE], SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE 2017-2018, SEANCE DU 
MERCREDI 4 JUILLET 2018 [EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 2017-2018, MEETING OF 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 4, 2018], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 5, 2018, p. 9095 (Mme. Maryse 
Carrère). In the original French: “[Q]ue l’on vienne ‘contraventionnaliser’ le 
harcèlement sexuel par l’ajout des comportements à connotation sexistes à la 
définition du harcèlement.” 
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different from each other, with only sexist behavior invoking issues 
of discriminatory treatment. However, that discussion might be 
better understood to suggest that there is a lack of exact overlap 
between sexual conduct and sexist conduct: Not all sexist conduct 
is sexual in nature, and presumably not all sexually harassing 
conduct is sexist. This understanding leaves room for considerable 
overlap between the two types of conduct, such that many forms of 
conduct that will be found to constitute sexual harassment will be 
considered sexist and, therefore, discriminatory in nature. 
In any event, the current prohibition of sexual harassment in 
the Penal Code, although not in the Labor Code, expressly 
incorporates the prohibition on both sexual and sexist or 
gender-based conduct, when that conduct results in harm to 
dignity or creates an intimidating or hostile environment.142 This 
change to the Penal Code provision accordingly defines sexual 
harassment as including behavior that has been equated with 
discrimination, that is, sexist or gender-based conduct. 
Accordingly, it appears that at least the Penal Code prohibition on 
sexual harassment now expressly incorporates both concepts of 
dignity and discrimination within its statutory provisions. 
V. The Effects of a Focus on Dignity Versus Discrimination 
An important question raised by the conceptualization of 
sexual harassment as a violation of dignity or as a form of 
discrimination, or perhaps as both, are the effects of that 
underlying conceptualization. That conceptualization does seem to 
matter, both with respect to the recognition of the harm of that 
behavior and the remedies provided for violation of the 
prohibitions against sexual harassment. 
The conceptualization of sexual harassment as a form of 
discrimination recognizes the collective nature of the harm 
imposed by harassment, in addition to the individual harms 
suffered by the women and the men subjected to it. In fact, in the 
early cases in the United States in which courts refused to 
                                                                                                     
 142.  Compare CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L 1153-1 
(referring to conduct with a sexual connotation) with CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] 
[PENAL CODE] art. 222-33 (referring with conduct with a sexual or gender-based 
connotation). 
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recognize sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, it was because courts viewed the harassment—
often in the form of sexual advances or coerced sexual conduct—to 
have been directed at an individual woman because she was 
sexually attractive to her male harasser, not because of her 
gender.143 It was the recognition by other courts that individual 
women were subjected to harassment because they were women 
that allowed those courts to view the harassment as discrimination 
and therefore an act that imposed collective as well as individual 
harm.144 A conceptualization of sexual harassment as a form of 
discrimination allows for a consideration of the extent to which 
sexual harassment is caused by and serves to perpetuate 
structural gender hierarchies.145 
In contrast, a conception of sexual harassment as a form of 
sexual violence seems to conceive of sexual harassment as an 
individual, rather than a collective, harm. Viewing sexual 
harassment through the lens of sexual violence suggests that the 
harm is an interpersonal one, a harm largely unconnected to the 
working life of women, even when the harassment occurs in the 
context of the workplace. This conception of sexual harassment 
seems to have been reflected in the fact that, at least until 2012, 
most cases of sexual harassment in France were pursued through 
the Penal Code, with criminal and civil penalties imposed on the 
harasser,146 rather than through the Labor Code, under which the 
                                                                                                     
 143. For example, the district court in Tompkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1977), 
dismissed the claim of the female plaintiff alleging that she had been fired for 
resisting the sexual advances of her supervisor, holding that Title VII was 
intended to promote equal employment opportunity, not “to provide a federal tort 
remedy for what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the 
part of the supervisor and which happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather 
than a back alley.” 
 144. See generally Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660–61 (D.D.C. 1978) 
(ruling of the district court that the female plaintiff who had alleged that she was 
discharged for refusing the sexual advances of her supervisor had stated a claim 
under Title VII because she alleged that the action of the supervisor was a 
condition of employment imposed on one sex but not the other), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom., Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 145. See generally NUMHAUSER-HENNING, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing 
effects of conceptualization of sexual harassment as a form of discrimination). 
 146. In France, unlike in the United States, courts in criminal cases can 
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remedy would be more likely to address the workplace harms 
suffered by the women who had been harassed.147 
It is somewhat more difficult to determine how the 
conceptualization of sexual harassment as a violation of dignity 
might affect the view of sexual harassment as either a collective or 
an individual harm. At one level, a focus on dignity—asking 
whether sexual conduct violates or undermines one’s dignity 
because it is degrading or humiliating—seems to speak of a 
personal, individualized harm, focusing on the effects of the sexual 
conduct on the particular person who suffers from it.148 On the 
other hand, the concept of dignity—particularly in the context of 
human rights—seems to also speak of a collective injury, such as 
that suffered by a group of people exposed to degradations.149 
The use of the French word dignité in the prohibitions on 
sexual harassment in the Penal and Labor Codes may suggest that 
the interests in protecting dignity may also extend to protecting 
interests in equality. Another portion of the Penal Code, titled 
“Attacks on the dignity of a person,” prohibits a number of actions, 
including discrimination, which would seem to invoke notions of 
                                                                                                     
award civil damages to the victims of sexual harassment. See Abigail C. Saguy, 
French and American Lawyers Define Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 604 (Catharine A. MacKinnon and Reva S. Siegel, eds. 
Yale University Press 2004). 
 147. In sexual harassment actions brought under the French Labor Code, if 
an employee can establish that she was sexually harassed and lost her 
employment as a result, her dismissal can be reversed and she can receive 
compensation in connection with that loss of employment. See, e.g., Cour d’appel 
[CA] [regional court of appeals] Basse-Terre, soc., September 25, 2017, N˚ de RG: 
16/00727 (nullifying employee’s dismissal, ordering her reinstated, and ordering 
damages for lost wages, as well as damages for the harassment after concluding 
that she had established the existence of sexual harassment and violation of the 
employer’s duty of prevention).  
 148. See NUMHAUSER-HENNING, supra note 10, at 7 (characterizing a “dignity 
harm” approach to sexual harassment as focusing on individuals, as contrasted 
with the systemic approach of discrimination). 
 149. The term “dignity” came into use on an international scale after World 
War II, including in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in an 
apparent reaction to the atrocities of the Holocaust, which inflicted not only 
individual but collective harm. See L. Camille Hébert, Divorcing Sexual 
Harassment from Sex: Lessons from the French, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 
36 (Fall 2013). 
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equality.150 Protection of equality interests through protection of 
dignity may also suggest that the harms sought to be protected 
against include collective harms, as well as individual harms. 
The understanding of sexual harassment as involving the 
collective harm of discrimination as well as the individual, and 
perhaps also collective, harm of violation of dignity is important 
for the ways in which sexual harassment is understood and 
therefore the way in which the prohibitions against sexual 
harassment are enforced. A focus on dignity seems to suggest that 
the real harm of sexual harassment is the embarrassment and 
shame inflicted on the women who are subjected to it. If that is the 
real harm of sexual harassment, then the way to remedy that harm 
is presumably to stop the conduct, presumably by the censure of 
the harasser, and to attempt to compensate the victim for the 
emotional costs imposed by the harassment. 
If sexual harassment is viewed as a discriminatory act, instead 
of or in addition to as a dignitary harm, the real harm of sexual 
harassment, particularly in the context of the workplace, may be 
seen as continuing the status of women as unequal participants in 
professional life, with the career and economic limitations that 
result. When women are treated as sexual objects in the workplace, 
subject to the sexual and sexist words and conduct by their 
superiors, co-workers, and perhaps even their subordinates, they 
are not just being embarrassed, but are being deprived of 
workplace opportunities. The remedy for this discriminatory 
conduct is not just to stop the harassment—although that is 
important—but to compensate women for the loss of workplace 
opportunities that they have suffered because of the harassment. 
In addition, the focus on harassment as an issue of discrimination 
may suggest that the remedy for the harassment is not just to 
adjust the situation between the parties, but to adjust the 
workplace itself, which allowed the harassment to occur. If 
harassment is viewed as a form of discrimination, the way to 
prevent and remedy the harm of sexual harassment in the 
                                                                                                     
 150. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] arts. 225-1 to 225-4. In the original 
French: “Des atteintes á la dignité de la personne.” Included in this chapter are 
provisions making it unlawful to discriminate on a number of grounds, including 
on the basis of sex, as well as to discriminate against a person who has refused to 
submit to sexual harassment. 
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workplace is to provide and promote equality between men and 
women in the workplace. 
There are, however, other potential implications of a focus on 
discrimination rather than dignity as the underlying foundation of 
a claim of sexual harassment. To the extent that the focus is on 
intentional discrimination, then thinking about sexual 
harassment as a form of discrimination may cause courts to delve 
into the motivation of harassers, finding harassment to be 
unlawful only if motivated by unlawful considerations.151 On the 
other hand, a focus on dignity seems to implicate not the 
motivation behind the harassment, but the effect of the 
harassment on those subject to it. 
But a focus on discrimination does not make inevitable an 
inquiry into the motivation of a harasser in order to determine if 
the sexually harassing conduct is unlawful. While intentional 
discrimination—called “disparate treatment” in the United 
States152 and “direct discrimination” in France153 and the 
                                                                                                     
 151. This result has occurred in the United States, in which there are many 
cases finding sexually hostile and degrading conduct not to be unlawful because 
it was motivated not by sex or gender, but by other unprotected (or less clearly 
protected) characteristics of the person harassed, such as his or her personality, 
sexual orientation, or gender identity. See generally L. Camille Hébert, Sexual 
Harassment as Discrimination “Because of . . . Sex: Have We Come Full Circle?, 
The Twenty-Fourth Annual Law Review Symposium, Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace: Fifteen Years after Meritor Savings Bank, 27 OHIO NORTHERN L. REV. 
439 (2001). 
 152. The United States Supreme Court has defined “disparate treatment” as 
a situation in which “[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than 
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” and for which 
“[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 
324, 335 n. 15 (1977). 
 153. In French law, “direct discrimination” is defined as situations in which a 
person “is treated less favorably than another” in a comparable situation based 
on protected characteristics. See Loi 2008-496 du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses 
dispositions d’adaptation du droit communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte 
contre les discriminations [Law 2008-496 of May 27, 2008 Laying Down Various 
Provisions for Adapting to Community Law in the Field of Combating 
Discrimination], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 28, 2008, p. 8801. In the original French:  
Constitue une discrimination directe la situation dans laquelle, sur le 
fondement de son appartenance ou de sa non-appartenance, vraie ou 
supposée, à une ethnie ou une race, sa religion, ses convictions, son 
âge, son handicap, son orientation sexuelle ou son sexe, une personne 
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European Union154—requires an inquiry into motivation, 
discrimination that is made unlawful because of its effects—called 
“disparate impact” in the United States155 and “indirect 
discrimination” in France156 and the European Union157—requires 
no inquiry into motivation. 
There is no reason that sexual harassment, even if 
conceptualized as a form of discrimination, necessarily will be 
considered a form of intentional discrimination requiring inquiry 
                                                                                                     
est traitée de manière moins favorable qu’une autre ne l’est, ne l’a été 
ou ne l’aura été dans une situation comparable. 
 154. The European Union has defined “direct discrimination” as “where one 
person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than another is, has been or 
would be treated in a comparable situation.” Council Directive 2006/54, 2006 O.J. 
(L 106) 1 (EC). 
 155. The Supreme Court in Teamsters defined “disparate impact” as claims 
involving “employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of 
different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and 
cannot be justified by business necessity,” and for which proof of discriminatory 
motive is not required.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15. 
 156. In French law, “indirect discrimination” is defined as  
a seemingly neutral provision, criterion or practice which, for one of 
the reasons mentioned in the first subparagraph, may be of particular 
disadvantage to persons in relation to other persons unless that 
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim and that the means to achieve that purpose are not necessary and 
appropriate. 
Loi n˚ 2008-496 du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation du 
droit communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations [Law 
No. 2008-496 of May 27, 2008 Laying Down Various Provisions for Adapting to 
Community Law in the Field of Combating Discrimination], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE 
LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] (May 28, 2008), 
p. 8801. In the original French:  
Constitue une discrimination directe la situation dans laquelle, sur le 
fondement de son appartenance ou de sa non-appartenance, vraie ou 
supposée, à une ethnie ou une race, sa religion, ses convictions, son 
âge, son handicap, son orientation sexuelle ou son sexe, une personne 
est traitée de manière moins favorable qu’une autre ne l’est, ne l’a été 
ou ne l’aura été dans une situation comparable. 
 157. The European Union defines “indirect discrimination” as “where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one sex at 
a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that 
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.” Council Directive 
2006/54, 2006 O.J. (L 106) 1 (EC). 
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into motive.158 It is true that the French prohibition on sexual 
harassment in the Penal Code will likely be interpreted to require 
intent on the part of the harasser. A similar prohibition on “moral 
harassment” found in the Penal Code,159 which does not expressly 
contain a requirement of intent,160 has been interpreted to impose 
such a requirement.161 Similarly, the provision on sexual 
harassment that prohibits coerced sex, in both the Penal Code and 
the Labor Code, may well be interpreted to impose a requirement 
of intent, both because of the language used in that prohibition—
prohibiting conduct with the “real or apparent goal” of obtaining 
sexual acts—but also because cases under the former prohibition 
of sexual harassment had seemed to impose an intent requirement 
in interpreting essentially the same language.162 
                                                                                                     
 158. I have explained elsewhere how sexual harassment in the United States 
can be considered discrimination under the disparate impact theory, as well as 
discrimination under the disparate treatment theory. See generally L. Camille 
Hébert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 341 (2005). At least one circuit court has agreed that disparate 
impact claims can be predicated on a hostile work environment. See Madonado v. 
City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing the article) (overruling 
on other grounds recognized in Bristow v. Endeavor Healthcare, LLC, 691 Fed. 
App’x 515, 521 (10th Cir. 2017)). 
 159. The prohibition on “moral harassment” contained in the French Penal 
Code provides that:  
Harassing others through repeated speech or behavior that has 
as its purpose or effect a deterioration of working conditions that 
may affect their rights and dignity, impair their physical or 
mental health, or jeopardize their professional future, is 
punished by two years of imprisonment and a fine of € 30,000.  
CODE PENAL [C. PEN] [PENAL CODE] art. 222-33-2. In the original French:  
Le fait de harceler autrui par des propos ou comportements 
répétés ayant pour objet ou pour effet une dégradation des 
conditions de travail susceptible de porter atteinte à ses droits 
et à sa dignité, d’altérer sa santé physique ou mentale ou de 
compromettre son avenir professionnel, est puni de deux ans 
d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 € d’amende. 
 160. While the reference to pour objet (“for purpose”) clearly seems to 
reference intent, the use of the terms ou pour effet (“or for effect”) would seem to 
indicate that intent is not required. 
 161. See generally Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] crim., June 8, 2010, No. 10-80570 (interpreting the Penal Code provision 
on moral harassment to require intent on the part of the perpetrator). 
 162. See generally Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] crim., November 10, 2004, No. 03-87,986 (interpreting prior version of 
48 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2018) 
However, there is no reason that the French provision on 
sexual harassment in the Labor Code that prohibits sexual conduct 
that imposes a harm to dignity or creates an offensive or hostile 
environment should be interpreted to impose an intent 
requirement. Not only does no express requirement of intent 
appear in that provision, but the European Union directive on 
which the French prohibition is based imposes no such 
requirement, because that provision expressly prohibits conduct 
that has “the purpose or effect” of violating dignity or creating an 
offensive or hostile environment. 
Similarly, when the European Union directive was 
incorporated into French law by the adoption of the provision on 
discriminatory harassment, the French legislature expressly 
defined “discrimination” to include “any act with a sexual 
connotation, undergone by a person and whose object or effect is to 
undermine his or her dignity or to create an intimidating, hostile, 
degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment.”163 If the 
express provision on discriminatory harassment in French law 
imposes no intent requirement, it seems unlikely that courts would 
impose such a requirement under a prohibition on sexual 
harassment that does not explicitly refer to discrimination. 
Accordingly, as long as sexually harassing conduct can be 
shown to have an adverse effect on the women who are its principal 
targets, which, as discussed above,164 some French courts seem to 
have recognized, a conceptualization of sexual harassment as a 
form of discrimination should not result in courts failing to 
recognize as actionable sexually harassing conduct simply because 
the discriminatory intent of the harasser cannot be established. 
                                                                                                     
Penal Code provision on sexual harassment to impose a requirement of intent). 
 163. Loi 2008-496 du 27 mai 2008 portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation 
du droit communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte contre les discriminations (1) 
[Law No. 2008-496 of May 27, 2008, Laying Down Various Provisions for the 
Adapting Community Law in the Field of the Fight Against Discrimination (1)], 
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE] (May 28, 2008), p. 8801. In the original French: “La discrimination 
inclut . . . tout agissement à connotation sexuelle, subis par une personne et ayant 
pour objet ou pour effet de porter atteinte à sa dignité ou de créer un 
environnement hostile, dégradant, humiliant ou offensant.” 
 164. See supra notes 52–79 and accompanying text. 
DIGNITY AND DISCRIMINATION 49 
VI. Conclusion 
A more extensive study of cases decided under the new 
prohibitions on sexual harassment contained in the French Penal 
Code and Labor Code will be necessary in order to determine the 
effect of the decision of the French legislators to model those 
prohibitions on European law, which conceptualizes sexual 
harassment as discrimination, but which also expressly references 
harms to dignity. Because of the lag between the occurrence of 
harassing conduct and decisions about that conduct by the courts, 
it is only now—over half a decade after enactment of the new 
prohibitions on sexual harassment—that the courts are deciding 
cases under those prohibitions. My study of those preliminary 
cases, however, suggests that the courts applying the new 
prohibitions have accepted a broader definition of sexual 
harassment, one that focuses not just on the individual harms 
associated with sexual harassment, those that implicate dignity, 
but also on the collective harms created by lack of equality between 
men and women in the workplace, which may be contributed to by 
the existence of sexual harassment and other forms of sexist 
behavior. 
Recent legislation enacted and considered in the French 
legislature also suggests that at least some of the participants in 
that process may be viewing sexual harassment as a form of 
discrimination and therefore a problem of inequality between men 
and women. Their conceptualization of sexual harassment in that 
way, rather than as just a harm to the dignity of its victims, may 
suggest that the way to prevent sexual harassment is to address 
issues of equality between men and women more generally, 
because attainment of more equity and equality between the 
genders may not only address concerns about sexual harassment 
but other important workplace issues as well. 
This French case study has implications for the law of other 
nations that prohibit sexual harassment, including the United 
States. In order to be truly effective at preventing sexual 
harassment in the context of the workplace, legal prohibitions 
against sexual harassment should recognize that that conduct 
implicates issues of both dignity and equality. An express reference 
to dignity and equality in those prohibitions could help those who 
are enforcing those prohibitions understand both the individual 
50 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3 (2018) 
harms to dignity and the collective harms of inequality that are 
caused by sexual harassment and that need to be remedied in 
compensating the victims of sexual harassment. A recognition that 
sexual harassment implicates both dignity and equality might also 
help employers and other entities prevent sexual harassment from 
occurring, by recognizing both the interpersonal issues and the 
structural issues of inequality that lead to sexual harassment in 
the workplace. 
